Over the past two decades, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the analysis of mass attitudes toward democracy worldwide (Ansu-Kyeremeh, 1999; Canache, Mondak, & Seligson, 2001; Dalton, 2004; Dobson & Grant, 1992; Norris, 1999; Rose & Shin, 2001; Shin & Wells, 2005) . Empirical evidence consistently shows that the majority of citizens favor democracy as an ideal form of government. Meanwhile, social scientists find that individuals without extensive experience with democratic institutions and processes tend to hold diverse conceptions of democracy (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Miller, Hesli, & Reisinger, 1997; Simon, 1998) . Within the postcommunist region, most empirical work has focused on Eastern Europe and Russia (Carnaghan & Barry, 1990; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Gibson, 1996; Gibson, Duch, & Tedin, 1992; Haerpfer, 2002; McIntosh, Mac Iver, Abele, & Smeltz, 1994; Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1998) , while sparse attention has been devoted to the analysis of political support in Central Asia (Haerpfer, 2008; Rose, 2002) .
This empirical inquiry seeks to contribute to public opinion literature in two ways. First, this study reinforces the importance of measuring support for specific democratic procedures to gauge mass attitudes toward democracy in non-Western societies. Since the concept of democracy is multi-dimensional, there is considerable confusion among citizens in new democracies and non-democracies about the meaning of democracy. The survey findings reported in this article unveil that the majority of both supporters and opponents of democracy as the preferred political regime tend to display support for such attributes of democracy as free and fair elections and freedom of expression. Thus, the use of survey items that distinguish between support for democracy as the preferred political regime and support for democratic procedures is necessary to fully understand the magnitude of support for the political regime. Second, this study extends existing literature on non-democracies by focusing on Central Asian states. In particular, this study adds to the growing empirical research on mass support for democratic principles in the Muslim world (Tessler & Gao, 2005; Tessler, Moaddel, & Inglehart, 2006) .
The four Central Asian states are selected to control for a number of political, socioeconomic, and cultural factors. Geographically, these states lie along the Silk Road route and border on Afghanistan, China, or Russia. In the 20th century, the territory of the contemporary Central Asian states was forcefully incorporated into the Soviet Union, triggering the installment of communism and the acceleration of Russification-imposition of Russian culture on the indigenous population. In this region, the population is predominantly Muslim. In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the former Soviet republics gained national independence and evolved into nondemocratic regimes with various degrees of state repression (for an overview, see Cummings, 2001; Luong, 2004) . A close inspection of democratic support in these states will shed light on the extent to which citizens in nondemocracies hold normative commitment to democracy.
Support for Democracy: Theory and Empirical Research
Democracy is a contested term in the literature (Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002) . Some scholars contend that democracy is associated with free and fair elections (Przeworski, 1991; Schumpeter, 1942) . Others argue that the notion of democracy encompasses a much broader set of properties. Dahl (1971) , for example, treats citizens' participation in political processes as a critical dimension of the democratic system. Ample empirical evidence from democracies and nondemocracies supports the argument that democracy is a multidimensional concept. Survey research indicates that citizens in Africa, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East attach a wide array of meanings to democracy (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Canache, Mondak, & Seligson, 2001; Miller, Hesli, & Reisinger, 1997; Shin, Park, Hwang, Lee, & Jang, 2003; Simon, 1998; Tessler et al., 2006) . Furthermore, scholars distinguish between preference for democracy as a regime and support for a set of democratic procedures (Shin & Wells, 2005) . It is widely upheld that the consolidation of democracy requires public support for both substantive and procedural dimensions of democracy.
Based upon cross-national survey research, one may conclude that preference for democracy as a political regime is nearly universal. The findings from the East Asia Barometer Survey, for example, show that preference for democracy as a political regime ranges from 45% in Taiwan to 84% in Thailand, while the desire for democracy hovers over 90% (Shin & Wells, 2005) . In the Arab world, Tessler and Gao (2005) find that the proportion of those who consider democracy as the best political system reaches 88% in Algeria and 95% in Jordan. Yet, survey research documents that support for democratic procedures tends to be lower than support for democracy in principle (Shin & Wells, 2005) .
In explaining individual-level variations in democratic support, scholars advance a number of arguments. Modernization theory postulates that upwardly mobile individuals are likely to serve as agents of change in traditional societies (Moore, 1966) . Consistent with modernization theory, better-educated, high-income individuals are more likely to appreciate the virtues of the democratic system. Another theoretical perspective suggests that culture and religion play a critical role in fostering or inhibiting popular support for democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) . In particular, some scholars argue that Islam is incompatible with democracy (Huntington, 1996; Kedourie, 1994) . Others challenge this assumption. Based upon the analysis of the data from the World Values Survey, Fares al-Braizat (2003) registers insignificant effects of religiosity on democratic support in the Muslim world. Likewise, Rose (2002) concludes that nominal identification with Islam has weak effects on the level of democratic support in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic.
By the same token, engagement in politics is believed to have a positive impact on the level of attachment to democracy. Bratton and Mattes (2001) , for example, argue that voting, identification with a political party, and membership in civic organizations may strengthen citizens' commitment to democracy. Yet, empirical research indicates that few citizens in the post-Soviet region join voluntary organizations (Howard, 2003) so the impact of this institution on the mass attitudes is unlikely to be captured in this study. According to the data from the LiTS, less than 5% of respondents in the Central Asian states hold membership in civic organizations. But voting is a common form of political action in the region: more than 75% of survey respondents reported voting in the most recent election. Voting is expected to be positively associated with democratic support in Central Asia.
In addition, political socialization theory posits that individuals socialized in the nondemocratic setting are less likely to relinquish their authoritarian orientations and embrace democratic values than those grown up in democracies. In sync with this argument, ample empirical evidence shows that young people socialized in the post-communist period tend to display greater commitment to democratic norms than older citizens grown up during the Soviet period (Dobson & Grant, 1992; Haerpfer, 2002; Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1998) . The empirical evidence from the post-Soviet region also indicates that women tend to report less support for democratic norms (Carnaghan & Bahry, 1990; Gibson, Duch, & Tedin, 1992) .
More broadly, scholars debate the extent to which public support for democracy is intrinsic or instrumental (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1998; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006) . One argument is that citizens need to appreciate democracy as a value in itself. Another contention in the literature is that individuals tend to take an instrumental view of the political regime, calculating its costs and benefits. Specifically, scholars disagree over the relative importance of political and economic outputs in boosting the level of democratic support. Recent empirical evidence suggests that citizens tend to place greater value on the provision of political, rather than economic, goods (Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1998) .
Moreover, the connection between support for democracy and preference for market economy has drawn academic attention. Empirical studies find a strong relationship between support for democratic principles and free market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe (Gibson, 1996; McIntosh et al., 1994) . While these two attitudes are closely linked, scholars debate the primacy of politics or economics. Based upon the analysis of survey data from Russia and Ukraine, Gibson (1996) concludes that democratic attitudes have a stronger impact on economic attitudes than vice versa. These empirical observations give analysts and policymakers some optimism about the enduring commitment to democracy in the face of socioeconomic transformations.
In light of existing literature, the present study seeks to understand how the following variables are related to attitudes towards democracy: education, income, age, gender, religion, voting, satisfaction with the state of economy, support for democratic procedures, and support for market economy. The next section summarizes data sources and the measurement of key variables.
Data
This study uses data from the LiTS designed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in collaboration with the World Bank and administered by the global market research firm Synovate from August to October 2006 (see Synovate, 2006) . Synovate employed a two-stage sampling method with census enumeration areas (CEAs) as primary sampling units (PSUs) and households as secondary sampling units. The individuals interviewed in each household were selected at random. During the first stage of sampling, approximately 50 PSUs were selected, using as a sampling frame the list of CEAs generated by the most recent census. During the second sampling stage, 20 households were selected from each of the selected PSUs. In each country, a total of 1,000 respondents participated in the survey. Based upon American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) Standard Definitions (AAPOR, 2009), the minimum response rate (RR1) is 65% in Kazakhstan, 80% in Kyrgyz Republic, 72% in Tajikistan, and 73% in Uzbekistan.
Measurement of Democratic Support
Public support for democracy is measured by asking respondents with which of the following three statements they agree most: (a) Democracy is preferable to any other form of political system; (b) Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government
may be preferable to a democratic one; (c) For people like me, it does not matter whether a government is democratic or authoritarian. Agreement with the first statement is interpreted as support for democracy.
Mass attitudes toward democratic procedures are measured by prompting respondents to report the level of importance they attach to the presence of certain institutional arrangements in their home country. Consistent with Dahl's (1971, p. 3) specification of institutional arrangements conducive to contestation and inclusiveness, the survey lists the following political procedures: (a) free and fair elections, (b) law and order, (c) freedom of speech, (d) independent press, (e) a strong political opposition, (f) a courts system that defends individual rights abuse by the state, (g) a courts system that treats all citizens equally, and (h) protection of minority rights. Since such institutional arrangements as law and order and equal treatment of citizens in courts can be found in nondemocracies, these indicators are excluded from the analysis. While the abovementioned survey items gauge the level of perceived importance of political procedures for the country as a whole, these measures can be used as crude indicators of support for democratic procedures. If respondents attach great importance to the nationwide presence of such institutional arrangements as free and fair elections and freedom of speech, then it is reasonable to assume that they are positively oriented toward these institutional arrangements. The measurement of other variables is summarized in Appendix A and B.
Findings Table 1 displays the magnitude of preference for democracy as an ideal form of government and support for democratic procedures in four Central Asian states. The proportion of those respondents who regard democracy as the preferred political regime ranges from 50.3% in Kazakhstan to 68.4% in Uzbekistan. Yet, almost one-fifth of respondents in the selected former Soviet republics see no difference between having democracy or autocracy. Constituting a total of 19.7% of Uzbeks, 22.9% of Tajiks, 21% of Kyrgyzs, and 27.8% of Kazakhs claim that ''it does not matter [for ordinary citizens] whether a government is democratic or authoritarian.'' These statistics point to a high degree of political apathy and disillusionment among the post-communist citizenry. Alternatively, this attitudinal pattern might be indicative of the lack of political knowledge about attributes of liberal democracy.
To gain a deeper understanding of mass support for democracy, the analysis further examines citizens' attachment to a set of specific political procedures. The results show that public support for such democratic procedures as free and fair elections and freedom of expression is extremely high. For example, the proportion of those respondents who consider free and fair elections as important for their home country ranges from 85% in Uzbekistan to 92% in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan. Among the enumerated democratic procedures, the presence of a strong political opposition elicits the least positive response. On average, 58% of respondents see the strong political opposition as an important component of the political regime. To some extent, the current opposition political parties in the Central Asian states are
to blame for the lack of mass support for the institution of the political opposition. The data from the LiTS reveal that only one-fourth of respondents in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic and barely half of respondents in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan place trust in political parties.
1
As shown in Table 1 , public support for such democratic procedures as free and fair elections and freedom of expression is more than 20% higher than the overall support for democracy. The attitudinal gap between broad support for democracy and the endorsement of specific democratic procedures is likely to arise from the conceptual ambiguity associated with the word ''democracy.'' While citizens in non-democracies might interpret the notion of democracy in different ways, they appear to concur upon the importance of key democratic institutions.
Next, Table 2 summarizes the strength of the bivariate relationship between preference for democracy and support for democratic procedures. Clearly, respondents tend to associate democracy with free and fair elections, freedom of expression, independent press, and the strong political opposition. Yet, support for the protection of citizens' rights in court and the protection of minority rights appears to be weakly connected to support for democracy as the political regime. Based upon results of the correlation analysis, only four indicators-free and fair elections, freedom of expression, independent press, and the strong political opposition-are combined into an additive index measuring the extent of support for democratic procedures (Cronbach's ¼ .76). 
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Overall, the level of support for democratic procedures is quite high among both professed supporters and opponents of democracy. Additional analysis reveals that even those respondents who report preference for autocracy or claim indifference about the regime type express support for free and fair elections. When it comes to the perceived importance of civil society actors, however, the attitudinal differences between supporters and opponents of democracy become more pronounced. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for example, the perceived importance of the independent press is approximately 20% higher among supporters of democracy. Likewise, the perceived importance of the political opposition is higher among those who report preference for democracy as an ideal form of government.
The present study proceeds with investigating individual-level variations in normative commitment to democracy. Table 3 presents the results of binary logistic regression analysis, with preference for democracy as the dependent variable. The regression analysis is performed separately for each of the four countries.
Several findings emerge from the statistical analysis. First, the strongest predictor of democratic support in Central Asia is preference for market economy. In the Kyrgyz Republic, for example, proponents of free market reforms are 10 times more likely to prefer democracy as a political regime. This is consistent with the theoretical argument about the congruence between capitalism and democracy. Second, the results indicate that support for democratic procedures contributes to the overall support for democracy. With the exception of Kazakhstan, the regression coefficient for the index is positive and statistically significant. Third, the results suggest that nominal affiliation with Islam tends to increase support for democracy in Central Asia. Muslims might perceive democracy as a better alternative to the current political regime because the nondemocratic rulers in the region tend to carry out heavy-handed repression of Islam and ruthlessly target religious practitioners, viewing them as a threat to the constitutional order (see International Crisis Group, 2003) .
In addition, the results provide partial support for the modernization theory. Educational attainment tends to increase the odds of democratic support. Yet, the 
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regression coefficient for education is significant only in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. By the same token, the regression coefficients for income and gender are statistically insignificant. The analysis uncovers some cross-country differences. Notably, the regression coefficient for the index measuring support for a set of political procedures is insignificant in the case of Kazakhstan. One can infer from this finding that citizens in this Central Asian state are rather ambivalent about the attributes of the democratic system. Another cross-country difference is related to the role of religion. While the regression coefficient for the variable ''Muslim'' is positive and statistically significant in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan, it is negative and insignificant in the case of Tajikistan. From 1992 to 1997, Tajikistan was engulfed in civil war, claiming between 40,000 and 80,000 lives (Jonson, 2006) . One of the prominent actors in the conflict was the Islamic Revival Party calling for the establishment of the Islamic state. This violent conflict might have left a deep imprint on the relationship between Islam and democratic support in Tajikistan. Even more strikingly, age has divergent effects on democratic support in the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. As hypothesized, young people in the Kyrgyz Republic are more likely to support democracy than older age groups. In Uzbekistan, however, democratic support increases with age. A closer look at political socialization processes, in general, and youth policies, in particular, may help us account for these cross-country differences.
Based upon the value of Nagelkerke's R-Square, one may infer that the explanatory power of the model ranges from 25% in Uzbekistan to 44% in Tajikistan. Given observed cross-country differences in the explanatory power of the selected variables, the analysis of country-level factors on democratic support is an area for future research.
Conclusion
Based upon the data from the LiTS, this study has examined democratic support in Central Asia. The findings demonstrate that the majority of respondents in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan favor democracy as an ideal form of government. Furthermore, the results reveal that citizens in the four Central Asian states tend to support such specific political procedures as free and fair elections and freedom of expression more strongly than democracy in the abstract. These findings demonstrate the added value of using several survey items to gauge support for democracy in countries without extensive democratic experience and, thus, without a shared understanding of the democratic system.
In addition, the statistical analysis reaffirms the significance of several sociodemographic and attitudinal variables in explaining individual-level variations in democratic support. The analysis finds that preference for market economy is the strongest determinant of support for democracy. By the same token, the study documents how support for such political procedures as free and fair elections, freedom of expression, independent press, and the strong political opposition contributes to support for democracy as the political regime. Furthermore, the results reveal that nominal affiliation with Islam is positively associated with democratic support in Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan. The analysis also shows that better-educated respondents tend to report greater support for democracy.
Notwithstanding preferences of the mass public, prospects for regime change are rather bleak in Central Asia. The ruling elite have deployed a wide array of measures to consolidate the non-democratic regimes and suppress dissent. Additional survey research is necessary to determine conditions conducive to the transformation of regime preferences into political action in repressive political regimes. Please imagine a ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the richest. On which step of the ten is your household today? 
Appendix A. Question Wording
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